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ABSTRACT
The climate-policy debate has only recently turned its full attention
to adaptation—how to address the impacts of the climate change that
we have already begun to experience and that will likely increase over
time. Legal scholars have in turn begun to explore how the many
different fields of law will and should respond. During this nascent
period, one overarching question has gone unexamined: How will the
legal system as a whole organize around climate change adaptation?
Will a new, distinct field of climate adaptation law and policy emerge,
or will legal institutions simply work away at the problem through
unrelated, self-contained fields, as in the famous Law of the Horse?
This Article is the first to examine that question comprehensively, to
move beyond thinking about the law and climate change adaptation
to consider the law of climate change adaptation.
Part I of the Article lays out our methodological premises and
approach. Using a model we call Stationarity Assessment, Part I
explores how legal fields are structured and sustained based on
assumptions about the variability of natural, social, and economic
conditions, and how disruptions to that regime of variability can lead
to the emergence of new fields of law and policy. Case studies of
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environmental law and environmental justice demonstrate the model’s
predictive power for the formation of new, distinct legal regimes.
Part II applies the Stationarity Assessment model to the topic of
climate change adaptation, using a case study of a hypothetical coastal
region to demonstrate the potential for climate change impacts to
disrupt relevant legal doctrines and institutions. We find that most
fields of law appear to be capable of adapting effectively to climate
change. In other words, without some active intervention, we expect
the law and policy of climate change adaptation to follow the path of
the Law of the Horse—a collection of fields independently adapting
to climate change—rather than organically coalescing into a new and
distinct field.
Part III explores why, notwithstanding this conclusion, it may still
be desirable to seek a different trajectory. Focusing on the likelihood
of systemic adaptation decisions with perverse and harmful results, we
identify the potential benefits offered by intervening to shape a new
and distinct field of climate adaptation law and policy. Part IV then
identifies the contours of such a field, exploring the distinct purposes
of reducing vulnerability, ensuring resiliency, and safeguarding
equity. These features provide the normative policy components for a
law of climate change adaptation that would be more than just a Law
of the Horse. This new field would not replace or supplant any
existing field, however, as environmental law did with regard to
nuisance law, and it would not be dominated by substantive doctrine.
Rather, like the field of environmental justice, this new legal regime
would serve as a holistic overlay across other fields to ensure more
efficient, effective, and just climate adaptation solutions.
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A few years ago, at a conference on the “Law of Cyberspace”
held at the University of Chicago, Judge Frank Easterbrook told the
assembled listeners . . . that there was no more a “law of cyberspace”
than there was a “Law of the Horse”; that the effort to speak as if
there were such a law would just muddle rather than clarify; and that
legal academics (“dilettantes”) should just stand aside as judges and
lawyers and technologists worked through the quotidian problems
that this souped-up telephone would present. “Go home,” in effect,
was Judge Easterbrook’s welcome.1

INTRODUCTION
Climate change is here. Its impacts are present in the current
2
landscape, and, barring miraculous developments in politics and
technology, it will be a part of the future for our generation and for

1. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 501, 501 (1999) (footnote omitted); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the
Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207–16 (presenting a written version of the
speech quoted in the text). The “Law of the Horse” is an old catch phrase used to refer to an
unnecessary effort to bring together unrelated and duly self-contained bodies of law. See id. at
207 (“Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people kicked by horses; still more
deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with
prizes at horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on ‘The Law of the
Horse’ is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles.”). Judge Easterbrook credits the
phrase to Karl Llewellyn. Id. at 214 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52
HARV. L. REV. 725, 735, 737 (1939); and Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle To Unhorse Sales,
52 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939)).
2. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 72 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/—
publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm (“Many natural systems, on
all continents and in some oceans, are being affected by regional climate changes. Observed
changes in many physical and biological systems are consistent with warming.”); U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES
9 (2009), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impactsreport.pdf (“Observations show that warming of the climate is unequivocal. The global warming
observed over the past 50 years is due primarily to human-induced emissions of heat-trapping
gases.”).
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many to follow. By our very nature, humans are adaptable creatures,
but those skills will surely be put to the test in the face of changes in
sea level, surface temperature, rainfall, snowmelt, ecosystems, and a
4
myriad of other shifting conditions, some gradual and some abrupt.
For some people, in some places, changes will be for the better—
think agriculture in Siberia—while for other people in other places
5
the prospect is dire—consider the low-lying Solomon Islands. The
challenge is clear, the question obvious: What should law and policy
6
do about the impacts of climate change?

3. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 72
(“Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for centuries even if [greenhousegas] emissions were to be reduced sufficiently for [greenhouse-gas] concentrations to stabilise,
due to the time scales associated with climate processes and feedbacks.”); V. Ramanathan & Y.
Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference with the Climate System: Formidable
Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14,245, 14,245 (2008) (estimating a committed
o
warming of 2.4 C even if greenhouse-gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan
Solomon, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Reto Knutti & Pierre Friedlingstein, Irreversible Climate
Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009)
(estimating a one-thousand-year committed warming effect).
4. For overviews of the likely global and domestic impacts, see generally
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2; and U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2.
5. Climate change is not all about harms—there will be benefits in many forms for many
regions of human populations and for many species. Agriculture in the United States, for
example, may find benefits from warming temperatures, increased precipitation, and higher
carbon-dioxide levels. See Olivier Deschênes & Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of
Climate Change: Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather, 97
AM. ECON. REV. 354, 355 (2007) (“If anything, climate change appears to be slightly beneficial
for profits and yields.”). In particular, and of relief to many, “the production of high-quality
wine grapes is expected to benefit from a warmer climate because of a longer growing season
and more favorable growing conditions in the short-term.” CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, 2009
CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY 94 (2009), available at http://resources.ca.gov/
climate_adaptation/docs/Statewide_Adaptation_Strategy.pdf. Most of the national-scale
economic-impact studies show Russia and Eastern Europe as best off under a range of climate
change scenarios, with small to substantial increases in GDP, and Africa, parts of Asia, and
small island states as worst off. See RICHARD S.J. TOL, AN ANALYSIS OF MITIGATION AS A
RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 6 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://fixtheclimate.com/
uploads/tx_templavoila/AP_Mitigation_Tol_v_3.0.pdf (presenting a chart based on synthesis of
over a dozen economic studies). For an examination of the impact of climate change on small
islands, see infra note 134.
6. For summaries of the legal and policy issues likely to come with climate change,
including reviews and syntheses of scientific and legal literature on the topic, see generally
Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty
Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity
Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010); Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law That
Bends Without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45 (2010); Robert L.
Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive

RUHL & SALZMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2013 4:14 PM

2013] CLIMATE CHANGE MEETS LAW OF THE HORSE

979

7

The answer is equally clear: climate change adaptation. We must
adapt to our new circumstances in their many specific settings as best
we can. On that much we can all agree. Alas, what this adaptation
entails is far less clear. Like the early explorers’ maps that filled in
distant seas and lands with the hopeful, enigmatic phrase, terra
incognita, there is no analog from humanity’s climate past on which to
8
chart humanity’s climate future.
Given the daunting challenges of this uncertain future,
decisionmakers are increasingly concerned about the “adaptation
9
deficit” in climate change law and policy that has amassed over time.
Until very recently, the focus on climate change mitigation,
particularly reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, has held center
10
stage. Debates over mitigation—how much and how fast to reduce
causes of climate change—largely crowded out considerations of

Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833 (2009); and J.B. Ruhl, Climate
Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363,
365–71 (2010).
7. Climate change “adaptation” refers to “measures to improve our ability to cope with or
avoid harmful impacts and take advantage of beneficial ones, now and in the future.” U.S.
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 8.
8. Ecologists now warn of the no-analog future—ecological variability unprecedented in
the history of ecology, riddled with nonlinear feedback and feed-forward loops, previously
unknown emergent properties, and new thresholds of irreversible change. See, e.g., Matthew C.
Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species Distribution Models and the
Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 2255, 2255 (2009) (“By
2100, a quarter or more of the Earth’s land surface may experience climatic conditions that have
no modern analog . . . . [L]ittle information exists to predict how species may respond under
[these] novel environments.”); Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 SCIENCE 823,
823 (2007) (“[I]f the climate changes over the next 100 years as current models predict, surviving
species throughout much of Earth’s land area will not simply migrate north and south en masse
as unchanging communities, as Charles Darwin once believed. Instead, they are likely to be
reshuffled into novel ecosystems unknown today.”); Douglas Fox, When Worlds Collide,
CONSERVATION, Jan.–Mar. 2007, at 28, 31 (arguing that it is likely that the world will enter into
a no-analog future within one hundred to two hundred years).
9. See Ian Burton, Climate Change and the Adaptation Deficit, in THE EARTHSCAN
READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 89, 90–92 (E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton
eds., 2009) (describing economic losses that have resulted from unpreparedness for weather
catastrophes related to climate change, and noting the “demand for attention to adaptation” at
meetings of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
10. See Ruhl, supra note 6, at 365–66 (“[T]he policy world’s fixation on achieving, or
blocking, federal greenhouse gas emission legislation as part of our national strategy for climate
change mitigation has contributed to our neglect of national policy for climate change
adaptation.” (footnote omitted)). Climate change “mitigation” refers to “measures to reduce
climate change by, for example, reducing emissions of heat-trapping gases and particles, or
increasing removal of heat-trapping gases from the atmosphere.” U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE
RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 11.
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adaptation—how best to manage the impacts of climate change.
Only now, facing the stark realities of the United Nations climate
12
13
negotiations and the failure to pass climate legislation in Congress,
has climate-policy dialogue in the United States started to shift
14
ground to incorporate adaptation as a significant policy component.
It stands to reason that the demands of climate change
adaptation will present new kinds of challenges and conflicts for
public and private legal institutions. It is no surprise, therefore, that a
flood of recent scholarship has focused on the implications of climate
change adaptation for the law––exploring how law will adapt in fields
as varied as insurance, environmental, immigration, water supply,
torts, energy, and property, to name just a few––while crosscutting
issues such as federalism and human rights are also receiving careful
15
attention.
Some scholars, however, have gone beyond examining discrete
fields of law, predicting that climate change adaptation could become
a broadly transformative agent of legal change. For example,
Professor Robin Craig argues that climate change adaptation will
demand both “new ways of thinking about law” and “a new legal
16
framework,” and offers ideas about some core principles of this
11. See Ruhl, supra note 6, at 365–70 (recounting the history of policy attention to
mitigation at the expense of attention to adaptation).
12. With the collapse of negotiations at Copenhagen, the prospect of global caps on
greenhouse-gas emissions has become remote. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Where Did Global
Warming Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2011, at A1.
13. Although the House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Bill), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009), climate legislation
died in the Senate, and there has been no attempt to reintroduce legislation. During the 2012
presidential campaign, none of the presidential candidates pushed the prospect of new
legislation. See, e.g., GOP Presidential Hopefuls Shift on Global Warming, USA TODAY (May
27, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2011-05-27-presidential-hopefuls-globalwarming_n.htm. In President Obama’s first press conference following his reelection, he
signaled that climate change legislation would not be a top priority in his second term. Andrew
Restuccia, President Obama Says Climate Change To Take Backseat to Economy, POLITICO
(Nov. 14, 2012, 4:19 PM EST), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83865.html.
14. See Ruhl, supra note 6, at 370–75 (discussing this shift in focus). The consensus now is
that “mitigation and adaptation are both essential parts of a comprehensive climate change
response strategy,” though much remains to be worked out. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 11.
15. For a broad survey of the legal literature on climate change adaptation, see Ruhl, supra
note 6, at 391–432. For a reference book with chapters on agriculture, energy systems,
insurance, financing, and more, see generally THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS (Michael Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds.,
2012).
16. Craig, supra note 6, at 17.
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17

“new climate change adaptation law.” Nor is she alone. A growing
number of commentators believe that climate change will impose
radical changes on society and that the law will, perforce, need to
18
adapt in similarly radical ways.
These are bold claims with significant implications for the
evolution of legal doctrine and institutions. But will the profound
need for social and economic adaptations to climate change create an
equally profound need for legal adaptations? If so, are those
adaptations likely to evolve through incremental changes across
numerous existing fields of law, or will they demand the formation of
a new, distinct field of climate adaptation law? To paraphrase Judge
19
Easterbrook’s quote at the head of this Article, it remains to be seen
whether law and policy for climate change adaptation will evolve as a
disconnected Law of the Horse or coalesce into a coherent field—
whether it becomes a law and climate change adaptation or a law of
climate change adaptation.
Nor is the and/of distinction merely a semantic quibble. As law
school course offerings seem designed to prove, there can be a law
and anything. Law of implies something more, that there is a need for
the legal system to respond to change from outside by changing inside
at a more fundamental level. This Article is therefore intended to
initiate a debate over the potential trajectories of climate adaptation
law, examining not only whether a new, distinct field is likely to
coalesce around the policies implicated by climate change adaptation
17. See id. at 17, 40–69 (suggesting and elaborating upon five broad principles that,
implemented over time, can effectively guide the law’s response to climate change).
18. See, e.g., Carl Bruch, The End of Equilibrium, ENVTL. F., Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 30, 35
(outlining the need for “adaptation law”); John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change
Law: An Introduction, 29 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (describing the emergence of “climate change
law” at “the intersection of several areas of law, including environmental law, energy law,
business law, and international law”); Jan McDonald, The Role of Law in Adapting to Climate
Change, 2 CLIMATE CHANGE 283, 284 (2011) (proposing “design requirements of a legal
framework for addressing the peculiar challenges posed by climate change risks”); Jacqueline
Peel, Climate Change Law: The Emergence of a New Legal Discipline, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 922,
924 (2008) (“[D]evising legal solutions to climate change is likely to involve profound changes to
existing governance and regulatory frameworks, with reverberations felt in many other areas of
law such as constitutional law, administrative law and property law.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Legal Disputes Related to Climate Change Will Continue for a Century, 42 Envtl. L. 1257, 1273
(2012) (arguing that the “steps we must take to adapt to climate change…will involve major
changes in the legal environment”); Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change:
Environmental Law in a Warmer World, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 61, 82 (2007) (“Environmental law,
as it stands or as it might be foreseeably reconfigured, may lack the capacity to respond to the
threats posed by adaptation to climate change.”).
19. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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but, more to the point, whether one should. We take a close look at
whether and how lawyers could purposively take part in that creation
moment—to choose whether to let the Law of the Horse run its
course or to pursue a law of climate change adaptation.
Precisely because the future trajectory remains uncertain, the
time to engage in this analysis is now. Decisions made today about
climate change adaptation––whether shaping the course of evolution
or sitting back and watching the drama unfold––may become
“sticky,” leading to path dependence and making it increasingly
20
difficult to change course if the need becomes apparent. If the stakes
are high, as they are likely to be with climate change, it is worth
thinking now about how to avoid going down the wrong path.
To make this discussion more concrete, consider the case of
environmental law, regarded as one of the most complex and
specialized fields of practice, with many of its own distinct problems,
21
doctrines, tools, institutions, and methods. The need for a law of the
environment may seem self-evident today, but its emergence as a
distinct field is relatively recent. The very term “environmental law”
22
did not even exist before 1969. In the 1970s, policymakers, lawyers,
activists, and legal scholars explicitly conceived of the law of the
environment as something more than just a bunch of unrelated legal
challenges that happened to intersect at the common factual ground
23
of the human impact on nature. A similar story could be told about
the field of environmental justice and its genesis in the late 1980s to
manage the distributional effects of environmental, land use, and
24
other policy realms. Recognized today as significant and separate
20. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 631, 641 n.161 (2001)
(“[C]haracteristics of the common law process lead a particular resolution of a legal issue to
become locked in; courts find it increasingly difficult to depart from the path once the first few
steps are taken.”).
21. See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal
Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 251–82 (2010) (arguing that, despite doctrinal variation
and even incoherence, identifiable core patterns frame environmental law as a discrete legal
field).
22. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 47 (2004) (describing
key players behind the formation of environmental law).
23. See id. at 79–84 (describing the 1970s as a “new era” during which stringent
Congressional oversight of agencies, citizen suits initiated pursuant to new statutes, and an
enthusiastic, exacting judiciary all combined to “serve[] an essential supporting role in
maintaining environmental law”).
24. The field of environmental justice law exploded in dimensions during the 1990s. See
generally, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF
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areas of theory and practice, the origins of environmental law and
environmental justice as distinct legal fields were intentional.
Ocean-management policy provides a clear contrast. For
decades, laws relating to the oceans took a passive Law-of-the-Horse
approach that virtually all policymakers and scholars now consider to
25
have produced a dysfunctional and ineffective legal regime.
Accreting over time, today the “Law of the Oceans” comprises a
26
crazy quilt of twenty federal agencies overseeing 140 statutes. Long
entrenched in this Law-of-the-Horse approach, recent and repeated
calls to overhaul this patchwork into a consolidated, coherent field of
27
law centered around oceans management have gained little traction.
Despite best efforts, it remains a Law of the Horse.
Part I thus opens the inquiry by examining what it means to refer
to a new and distinct field of law and why it is important to anticipate
when one may be needed for effective implementation of emerging
policy goals. To probe when new fields are likely to form, we develop
an analytical framework known as a Stationarity Assessment.
28
Extending the recent work of water-resource managers, a
Stationarity Assessment assesses why and when distinct fields evolve

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1998); KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1st
ed. 1995); DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1st ed.
1996); Symposium, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425
(1994); Symposium, Race, Class, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839
(1992). For thorough bibliographies of the deep and broad environmental justice literature that
had developed even by the mid-1990s, see generally Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of
Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,543 (1995); and Carita
Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997).
25. See, e.g., L.B. Crowder et al., Resolving Mismatches in U.S. Ocean Governance, 313
SCIENCE 617, 617 (2006) (“Historically, ocean management has focused on individual
sectors. . . . Separate regimes for fisheries, aquaculture, marine mammal conservation, shipping,
oil and gas, and mining are designed to resolve conflicts within sectors, but not across sectors.”);
Christopher Shane Studley, Ocean Policy and Change: Is There Hope for Ocean Reform?, 18
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 105, 105–11 (2009) (tracing the development of the United States’s
“fractured and dysfunctional national policy for ocean management”).
26. Crowder et al., supra note 25, at 617.
27. Professor Larry Crowder and his coauthors argue that because the declining ocean
conditions “are largely due to failures of governance, reversing them will require new, more
effective governance systems,” yet they recognize that “these governance problems are difficult
to alleviate even after they become well understood.” Id. at 617–18; see also Studley, supra note
25, at 111–31 (providing an overview of proposed reforms but concluding that “[t]here are many
obstacles to overcome before ocean policy reform occurs”).
28. See P.C.D. Milly, Julio Betancourt, Malin Falkenmark, Robert M. Hirsch, Zbigniew W.
Kundzewicz, Dennis P. Lettenmaier & Ronald J. Stouffer, Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water
Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573 (2008).
AND JUSTICE:

RUHL & SALZMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2013 4:14 PM

984

[Vol. 62:975

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

in response to disruptions to those fields’ underlying natural, social,
and economic foundations. Part I explains the details of the
Stationarity Assessment model and applies it to the histories of
environmental law and environmental justice to demonstrate its
explanatory power.
Part II applies the Stationarity Assessment model to a case study
of climate change adaptation in a diverse coastal region feeling the
environmental, social, and economic effects of climate change. Rising
mean surface temperatures, sea-level rise, changes in precipitation,
and other changes are likely to present pressing and in some cases
novel kinds of legal issues, but we find that for most purposes a Lawof-the-Horse approach will be adequate—existing doctrines and
institutions in the relevant fields of law can effectively adapt to the
changed conditions. In a small number of fields, however, notably
those with foundations that rest heavily on stationarity assumptions
of biophysical conditions, the law will be put under such intense
pressure that current doctrines and institutions will need to respond
with more deliberate and potentially substantial adaptation.
Nevertheless, we conclude that there is little reason to believe that
even these fields will radically transform when faced with the
challenges of climate change adaptation. In short, it is difficult to
envision how climate change adaptation will necessitate dramatic
transformations of the doctrinal foundations and institutional
architecture of any particular field of law, much less lead to the
organic evolution of a new field of climate adaptation law.
Part III explores why, notwithstanding this conclusion, it may
still be desirable to seek a different trajectory, to intervene
intentionally and create a new and distinct field of climate adaptation
law and policy. Adapting to the impacts of climate change will vary
depending on each location’s geography and vulnerabilities. As a
result, any need for new substantive law and policy will likely be
place- and topic-specific. At the systemic level, however, adaptation
decisions will implicate multiple actors and concerns across different
landscapes, sectors, and communities. It is at this systemic scale that a
new field focused on procedure rather than substance would be most
useful to guard against and manage unintended, perverse responses to
climate change impacts.
This conclusion has major implications for how lawyers and legal
institutions approach climate change adaptation. Part IV thus
identifies the contours of such a nascent field, exploring adaptation’s
distinct goals of reducing vulnerability, ensuring resiliency, and
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safeguarding equity. These features provide the normative
components for a law of climate change adaptation that would make
it more than just a Law of the Horse. The climate adaptation field we
envision, however, would not replace or supplant any existing field, as
29
environmental law did with regard to nuisance law, and it would not
be dominated by substantive doctrine, as is largely the case under
environmental law. Rather, as environmental justice has done for
30
environmental, land use, and public-infrastructure-and-services law,
this new field would function as a procedural overlay to ensure more
efficient, effective, and just climate adaptation solutions across the
spectrum of other legal fields.
I. ANTICIPATING NEW LEGAL FIELDS
Legal scholars since the heyday of the legal realism movement
have considered what makes fields of law distinct, why lawyers refer
to this field of law and that field of law, but not others, and whether
31
fields should be defined by their structure or focus of study.
Notwithstanding this rich scholarly history, “no ultimate authority
32
exists for defining a field of law.” It may simply be that “a field may
be defined by its own practitioners for their purposes or tastes. The
33
test of its validity lies in whether others accept it.” Whether others
should accept the pronouncement of new fields lay at the heart of the
cyberspace law debate captured by Judge Easterbrook’s comments.
This Part draws on the tensions of that debate and considers what it
means generally to describe a collection of laws and policies as a field
and why new fields of law emerge.
A. On the Law of the Horse and Why It Matters
There is no better starting point for considering what makes a
field of law distinct and useful than the classic nonfield of law—the
fabled “Law of the Horse.” There is, of course, no coherent Law of
the Horse, which was the point of Judge Easterbrook’s derisive
comments. Legal issues concerning horses arise across a range of

29. See infra Part I.B.3.
30. See infra Part I.B.3.
31. See Wendy K. Mariner, Toward an Architecture of Health Law, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 67,
79–82 (2009) (describing the process by which various legal fields have arisen, with attention to
the different approaches that have been employed to define these discrete fields).
32. Id. at 82.
33. Id.
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practice fields—veterinary law, racing law, agricultural law, consumer
34
law, and so on. This is not merely an equine observation. Take rain,
for example. It falls on many aspects of our lives, but it would be
nonsensical to think of “rain law” as a distinct field. Rather, questions
as varied as who has rights to rain once it falls, whether someone can
treat clouds to induce or prevent rain, how event planners can insure
against unwanted rain, liability for damages from rain, and how to
respond to flooding from too much rain are divvied out to a broad
35
variety of public- and private-law fields. To describe someone as a
“horse lawyer” or a “rain lawyer,” in other words, is meaningless.
Hence Judge Easterbrook’s challenge to self-proclaimed
cyberspace lawyers a decade ago. Although everyone acknowledged
that the Internet and its allied technologies had ushered in
remarkable changes, it was less clear that this compelled the
development of a correspondingly distinct “Law of Cyberspace.”
Easterbrook argued that there was no need for anything of the sort,
that the Law of Cyberspace was a meaningless fiction no more useful
36
than a Law of the Horse. There might be plenty of new legal issues
associated with the emergence and growth of cyberspace, but judges
and lawyers could effectively adapt existing doctrines, tools, and
methods of law across a multitude of fields to work through them,
albeit sometimes in novel and different combinations and
37
applications.
Similarly, climate change will put pressure on law to adapt, of
that there is no doubt. But is the idea of a “Law of Climate Change
Adaptation,” like the “Law of Cyberspace,” no more than a fatuous
34. See supra note 1. To be fair, though, some do speak of horse law. The law firm of
Foster Swift, for example, maintains the Equine Law Blog. EQUINE LAW BLOG, FOSTER SWIFT
COLLINS & SMITH P.C., http://www.equinelawblog.com.
35. As some simple searches in Westlaw and Lexis databases demonstrated to us, law and
commentary on all of these issues are easy to locate through traditional legal research, whereas
after similar efforts to find law and commentary on a distinct “law of rain” or “rain law” field of
theory or practice, we can confirm that it does not exist.
36. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207 (“When asked to talk about ‘Property in
Cyberspace,’ my immediate reaction was, ‘Isn’t this just the law of the horse?’”).
37. As Judge Easterbrook explained:
Error in legislation is common, and never more so than when the technology is
galloping forward. Let us not struggle to match an imperfect legal system to an
evolving world that we understand poorly. Let us instead do what is essential to
permit the participants in this evolving world to make their own decisions. That
means three things: make rules clear; create property rights where now there are
none; and facilitate the formation of bargaining institutions. Then let the world of
cyberspace evolve as it will, and enjoy the benefits.
Id. at 215–16.
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Law of the Horse? How would we know—how do we tell the Law of
the Horse from the law of anything else?
Some insight on this can be drawn from the debate that
surrounded cyberspace law. Judge Easterbrook did not have the last
word, as lawyers continued to hash out why cyberspace does or does
not warrant the distinction of a legal field. On the side of describing
cyberlaw as a distinct field, scholars focused on its “usefulness of joint
38
treatment of similar problems.” This useful role for a distinct field,
they argued, derives from the uniqueness of the underlying structure
of the cyberspace subject matter, the new infrastructure that the
Internet provides for information markets and other social practices,
39
and novel questions of cyberspace governance. To generalize their
argument, new fields of law are likely to emerge when some external
force—in that case technology—presents profoundly novel subject
matter, socioeconomic conditions, and governance challenges for law.
On the other side of the debate came arguments that the
technological novelty of the Internet served as no more reason to
craft a new field of law than was, say, the automobile. As one skeptic
argued, “[v]ery few bodies of law are defined by their characteristic
technologies. Tort law is not ‘the law of the automobile,’ even though
40
the auto accident is the paradigmatic tort case.” The newness of the
Internet, they concluded, thus served as no basis for a distinct field of
law even if it did lead to novel social practices, as “even new social
41
practices are often well served by traditional legal devices.”
Reinforcing Judge Easterbrook’s assessment, one scholar summed up
that
most legal doctrines are flexible and likely to accommodate new
social practices in their interstices. Filling interstices may be a form
of novelty, but can be no more than an interstitial one. Therefore,
most novel law resembles an extension or amalgamation of familiar

38. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet
Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 605, 608 (2003). Writing about environmental law, Professor Todd
Aagaard similarly observed that
[a] field of law must exhibit some degree of commonality, a characteristic or set of
characteristics shared in common by the situations that arise within the area of law
that the field encompasses. Commonalities establish patterns that cohere the
field. . . . Only when the common characteristics are legally relevant do the materials
they encompass appear as an identifiable corpus.
Aagaard, supra note 21, at 242.
39. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 38, at 608–10.
40. Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147 (2000).
41. Id. at 1148.
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legal categories. . . . Of course, legal doctrines will change; they
always do. The new information technologies will trigger some of
these changes. But with a few exceptions, these changes will exist
42
only in the details.

Even the most ardent critics of cyberspace law as a field
conceded, however, that “substantial changes to the legal landscape
43
sometimes occur.” Sometimes, in other words, the interstices of
existing fields are simply not of sufficient volume to hold all of the
novelty that some new agent of change is throwing at the legal
system—a new field is needed.
But why try to create a field? The distinction between the Law of
the Horse and a coherent field of law is more than semantic. Credible,
legitimate fields of law serve at least three important purposes. First,
they can provide a forceful political statement. It is no coincidence
that broad and deeply rooted social movements, such as
environmentalism in the 1970s and sexual orientation in the 1980s,
eventually also became associated with distinct fields of law and
44
policy. Early advocates in these fields wrote textbooks. These not
only made the case that particular issues, laws, and policies should be
conceived as discrete fields but paved the way for law school courses
in these fields, training the next generation of lawyers to think of
45
these as credible, legitimate areas of practice. Interestingly,
advocates of Disaster Law are attempting precisely the same thing
right now. Concerned over inadequate responses to Hurricane
Katrina and social-justice issues, Professors Dan Farber, Rob
42. Id. As Professor Aagaard similarly has observed,
[a]n area of law unified only by factual commonality—that is, a common factual
characteristic or characteristics that make no difference to the application of the
law—is, like the Law of the Horse, a joke rather than a legitimate field of legal study
because the various laws that govern activities related to horses have nothing legally
important in common.
Aagaard, supra note 21, at 242 (citation omitted).
43. Sommer, supra note 40, at 1148.
44. For an early textbook on environmental law, see, for example, FRANK P. GRAD,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: SOURCES AND PROBLEMS (1st ed. 1971). For an early textbook on
sexual-orientation law, see, for example, LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW (William B.
Rubenstein ed., 1993).
45. Professors Dan Mandelker and Dan Tarlock played this role in environmental law,
with their pathbreaking casebooks. See EVA H. HANKS, A. DAN TARLOCK & JOHN L. HANKS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1974); DANIEL
MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT: CASES, TEXT & PROBLEMS (2d ed.
1971). Professor Bill Rubenstein played a similar role with the publication of his pathbreaking
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 44, known in subsequent editions as CASES
AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW.
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Verchick, and other scholars have published a casebook and are
46
encouraging the teaching of Disaster Law courses.
Second, fields can increase efficiency. If highly technical or deep
knowledge is not widely available to address important crosscutting
issues, it may make sense to form a new field around that specialized
knowledge rather than force an existing field to morph itself to
absorb the topic whole. Hence the ascendance of food-and-drug law
or telecommunications law. Similarly, because of rising public interest
or commercial importance, it may be more efficient to think of
different fields operating under the same umbrella—think of sports
law and its selective drawing from contracts, torts, insurance, and
47
other legal fields. Finally, the current legal pastiche may prove to be
inadequate. The paradigm simply fails to get the job done. This was
the case for reliance on nuisance doctrines for environmental
protection and arguably is so for health law’s inadequate reliance on
48
tort and contracts.
Depending on the circumstances, then, creation of a new field
can serve political ends by legitimating a social movement, enhance
efficiency by providing a focal area for technical expertise, ensure
effectiveness by reorienting laws and policies in a more productive
structure, or some combination of all three. The main point is that the
developing a field of law both implies and signifies more than coming
up with a faddish name.

46. DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK & LISA GROW SUN,
DISASTER LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2010); see also Symposium, Disaster Law, 23 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2013). See generally Disaster Law, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/1374.htm (describing the Disaster Law course, blog, and resources
at the University of California, Berkeley). So, too, have casebooks started appearing on climate
change law. See generally, e.g., HARI OSOFSKY, WILLIAM C.G. BURNS & LESLEY K.
MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY (2012); CHRIS WOLD, DAVID HUNTER &
MELISSA POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW (2009).
47. See generally PAUL C. WEILER, GARY R. ROBERTS, ROGER I. ABRAMS & STEPHEN F.
ROSS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS (4th ed. 2010) (describing the
various fields of law implicated in sports-related issues).
48. The coherence of health law as a field nonetheless remains in question. See, e.g., Einer
R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365
(2006) (noting the disjointed state of the law governing health issues); Mark A. Hall, The
History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347,
354 (2006) (describing health law as a “hodgepodge” composed of four separate and distinct
branches).
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B. Stationarity-Based Design in Law and Policy
One can imagine two distinct trajectories for climate adaptation
law and policy.
o

A New Field of Climate Change Adaptation. Discrete areas of
law develop increasingly tight interconnections around climate
change adaption policies that lead legal doctrines and
institutions to coalesce into a distinct, coherent field with
principles all its own.

o

A Law of the Horse. Combinations of different existing fields
occasionally intersect as needed to work on adaptation solutions,
forming nothing more coherent than a Law of the Horse.

Neither course is self-evident circa the vantage of 2013. Just as
early environmental lawyers did in the 1970s, environmental justice
advocates did in the 1980s, and cyberspace lawyers did in the 1990s,
considering these issues for climate change adaptation now is
important for the simple reason that how climate adaptation law and
policy are thought of today will influence their design and
implementation well into the future. In short, better to get it right for
climate change adaptation at a nascent stage, or at least to think
carefully about which is the better organizational approach, than to
have the lawyers of the future look back and wish that a different
path had been taken.
Our first step is to assess which path the law, in the face of
climate change impacts, is likely to follow without intervention. To do
so, in this Section we develop a general, predictive model for when
new fields of law coalesce in response to episodes of social, economic,
technological, or environmental change.
1. Stationarity in Natural Systems. Since the dawn of cities,
communities have needed to manage their water resources.
Particularly in water-scarce areas, water engineers have faced
decisions over when and where to build costly infrastructure. This
need was as true for ancient Rome’s aqueducts as it is for today’s
desalination plants. In all cases, managers must necessarily assume
boundaries of natural system variability to make reliable and costeffective short-term and long-term decisions. An understanding of
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how much water supplies vary from year to year is critical to planning
49
for dams and reservoirs.
Nor is the assumption of boundaries solely true for water
management. The “dynamic equilibrium” model now firmly in place
in fields such as ecology is based on the assumption that although
natural systems vary, the size of the range of variability experienced
over long time frames in the past will continue relatively unchanged
50
into the future. Although change in natural systems is inherent, it
tends to be bounded within predictable confines. There is a reason
why massive deluges are called a 100-year flood—we can reasonably
expect such an event every century.
This “idea that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging
envelope of variability” is known in the resource- and infrastructure51
management disciplines as the “stationarity assumption.” It assumes
that change can be managed within a fairly well-defined range of
extremes. Water-resource managers, for example, have to
accommodate change in their infrastructure planning as periods of
drought and heavy precipitation come and go. Human interventions
in natural systems, such as dams and dikes in the water-management
context, provide further flexibility to deal with significant changes in
rainfall. Thus planners “generally have considered natural change and
variability to be sufficiently small to allow stationarity-based
52
design.” Without this assumption, which has been well justified by
the historical record over relevant time frames, planners would not be

49. See generally A. DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR., DAVID H. GETCHES &
REED D. BENSON, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY (6th ed. 2009) (examining the significance of variation in water supply); Milly et al.,
supra note 28 (challenging the continued validity of stationarity as a central assumption of
water-resource planning).
50. Ecologists developing this model place less emphasis on classical conceptions of stasis
and natural stability. See, e.g., Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and Creativity: The New
Ecology and Some Old Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 56–57 (1996); Reed F.
Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994) (“Among the new paradigms in ecology, none is more
revolutionary than the idea that nature is not delicately balanced in equilibrium, but rather is
dynamic, often unpredictable, and perhaps even chaotic.”); see also Jonathan Baert Wiener,
Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325,
327–28 (1995) (reviewing JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF
EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME (1994)).
51. Milly et al., supra note 28, at 573.
52. Id.

RUHL & SALZMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2013 4:14 PM

992

[Vol. 62:975

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

able to design, finance, and operate massive, capital-intensive, long53
term projects on major river systems or in large agricultural districts.
But the extreme biophysical disruptions of climate change will
systematically challenge the stationarity assumption across the board.
54
As one researcher has bluntly predicted, “stationarity is dead.” This
necessarily means that planning and decision methods incorporating
stationarity-based resource-management and infrastructure-design
55
principles need to be revisited, lest they become “dead” as well. In
2010, for example, the city of Seattle was planning to install a quarterbillion dollars’ worth of storm drain pipes, meant to serve the city for
56
the next seventy-five years. Given the realities of climate change,
however, the city’s planners asked a question that should have been
easy to answer: What diameter should the pipes be? If the past
century of rain records are no longer a useful guide for predicting
storm-runoff loads, could climate models help guide the storm-drain
57
design? The city’s meteorologist said that he “told them I couldn’t
58
give them an answer.”
The question for resource and infrastructure managers,
therefore, is whether climate change will so alter natural systems as to
render obsolete the assumptions of stationarity-based management
and design. Many believe that planning going forward must be based
on a changing climate and greater uncertainty, depending on which
59
climate-forcing scenario seems most probable.

53. See id. (“Stationarity . . . is a foundational concept that permeates training and practice
in water-resources engineering.”).
54. Id.
55. See Victor B. Flatt & Jeremy M. Tarr, Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers: Managing Water Supply in a Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1499,
1500 (2011) (“Our laws must adapt when they can no longer serve their intended function in
light of a climate-altered world.”).
56. Richard A. Kerr, Vital Details of Global Warming Are Eluding Forecasters, 334
SCIENCE 173, 173 (2011).
57. See Flatt & Tarr, supra note 55, at 1504–05.
58. Kerr, supra note 56, at 173; see also Milly et al., supra note 28, at 573–74 (“Systems for
management of water throughout the developed world have been designed and operated under
the assumption of stationarity.”); cf. Richard A. Kerr, Time To Adapt to a Warming World, but
Where’s the Science?, 334 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2011) (discussing the paucity of “actionable
science” upon which adaptation decisions can be made).
59. See Milly et al., supra note 28, at 574 (“Nonstationary hydrologic variables can be
modeled stochastically to describe the temporal evolution of their [probability density function],
with estimates of uncertainty. Methods for estimating model parameters can be developed to
combine historical and paleohydrologic measurements with projections of multiple climate
models, driven by multiple climate-forcing scenarios.”).
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The bottom line, however, is that the end of stationarity in
biophysical systems means the end of business as usual for resource
management and infrastructure planning. Does it also mean the end
of business as usual for law? Perhaps so.
2. The Stationarity Assessment Model for Legal Fields. Law also
depends heavily on stationarity-based design. Every field of law is
embedded in assumptions about variability in natural, social, or
economic conditions. The development of environmental law, for
example, has embraced the “dynamic equilibrium” model of
ecosystems and its assumptions about the relatively stable envelope
60
of variability in natural systems. But stationarity-based design in law
is not limited to fields devoted to natural systems. Family law, for
example, rests upon basic social assumptions such as what constitutes
a family, the responsibility of the state to protect minors, and the role
61
of women in society. These assumptions have direct impacts on
practical policies such as whether to allow same-sex couples to adopt,
when children should be removed from the home, and the right to
alimony for divorced women. As society’s views have changed toward
gay rights and women’s rights so, too, have these new views brought
62
fundamental changes in family law.
Similarly, climate change will trigger potentially sweeping
transformations in natural, social, and economic systems. These
changes, however, will vary across the landscape and will not affect
law uniformly across all fields. For example, it is difficult to think of
any stationarity assumptions of family law being significantly
distorted by climate change. There may be more demand for family
lawyers in areas hard hit by climate change as families come under
financial and personal stress, but this hardly presents a need for

60. E.g., Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 863–64, 868 (1994); Wiener, supra
note 50, at 333–34.
61. See generally LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY
LAW (4th ed. 2010).
62. See, e.g., Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell
Us About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
41, 53–55 (2011) (exploring how the increase in working women has affected societal attitudes
and by extension alimony payments to women when they divorce); Edward Stein, The
“Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition for Same-Sex
Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 411–12 (2009) (arguing that changes in societal views
about marriage and procreation have influenced court decisions regarding marriage and
adoption for same-sex couples).
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family law to transform. The foundations of family law are neither
built directly or indirectly on assumptions about the biophysical
impacts of sea level or the timing of snowmelt, nor are they built on
the related social and economic impacts of those biophysical
phenomena. No surprise, therefore, that climate change adaptation
63
has not been a hot topic in family-law scholarship.
By contrast, some fields of law rest deeply on assumptions about
variability in conditions that climate change may affect substantially.
Environmental law is an obvious example, but it is not alone.
Consider the age-old common-law rules of littoral-property rights—
how property rights should be allocated when waters move across the
land—and how those rules account for physical change in the coastal
64
environment through doctrines such as accretion and avulsion.
These doctrines have developed over a historic period with little
variability in sea level, storm surges, storm frequency, or storm
intensity. Those coastal-system attributes fluctuate over time, which is
the very reason littoral-rights law developed these doctrines, but the
range within which those attributes fluctuate has not deviated much
for a very long time. That said, property law has never faced the
prospect of the sea level rising a foot or more.
Perhaps sea-level rise will turn out to be of no consequence to
the law of littoral rights, as lawyers and courts put all the existing
doctrines to work to adjust for the effects as they arise. Or, perhaps,
conflicts created by sea-level rise will require changes to the existing
set of doctrines. Rapid sea-level rise may so distort the envelope of
variability in coastal conditions that the law of littoral-property rights
simply will not work anymore and a new system of rules will become
necessary. Any of these paths of the law seems plausible. No surprise,
therefore, that climate change has been a hot topic in littoral65
property-law scholarship.

63. We have been unable to find legal commentary suggesting any such connections. There
is no chapter on family law in any text on climate change adaptation. See, e.g., THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 15.
64. See Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1091, 1109 (2011).
65. See generally, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment
on Regulatory Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625 (2010);
Doremus, supra note 64; Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property
Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51
(2011); Symposium, Sea Level Rise and Property Rights, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 239
(2011).
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Moving from family law and littoral rights to a more theoretical
level, we argue that this kind of Stationarity Assessment can serve as
a model framework for evaluating the likelihood of any new legal
field emerging from significant changes to background natural, social,
and economic conditions. The assessment involves a three-step
inquiry:
o

Step 1. What is the envelope of variability for the key natural,
social, and economic attributes within which a field of law
operates and on which its assumptions for theory and practice
are based?

o

Step 2. To what extent will forces of change distort the field’s
envelope of variability?

o

Step 3. To what extent will the expected new variability regime
require altering or abandoning the stationarity-based
components of the field’s theory and practice?

We readily admit that this is a simple model for a complex
phenomenon, but its basic questions offer explanatory power. The
model’s focus ties directly back to the themes underlying the
cyberspace-law debate outlined in Part I. Agents of change, in that
case technological, frequently generate novel subject matter, social
practice, and governance challenges, but usually these new challenges
fit within the range of variability assumptions on which the relevant
fields of law are based. The critics of cyberlaw-as-a-field argued this
very point—that the novelties wrought by the Internet were within
the comfort zone for “the fields of law tarred with the ‘cyberlaw’
brush: commercial law, the problems of multiple sovereignty, and a
potpourri of privacy, intellectual property, and the First
66
Amendment.” The interstices of these existing fields, in other words,
had plenty of capacity to absorb the changes. But when change begins
to push legal challenges outside of the stationarity-based assumptions
of relevant existing fields, one should begin to question whether the
interstitial capacity is truly there. In short, novelty alone does not
justify the emergence of a new legal field.
To demonstrate the Stationarity Assessment model’s robustness,
we apply it to two historical examples of the emergence of distinct
fields of law—environmental law and environmental justice. We then
apply the model to climate change adaptation and law in Part II.
66. Sommer, supra note 40, at 1149–50.
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3. Testing the Model for Environmental Law and Environmental
Justice. Few would suggest today that environmental law is an empty
construct, a Law of the Horse. Quite the contrary, “in everyday
discourse, the label ‘environmental law’ signifies a distinct and unique
67
area of law.” Lawyers identify themselves (and are recognized by
others) as “environmental lawyers,” and those who lack this title are
wary of entering the doctrinal thicket. Yet this most certainly was not
the case five decades ago.
Prior to the 1970s, environmental problems had been addressed
almost exclusively through common-law doctrines such as nuisance
68
and trespass. There were no comprehensive environmental
protection agencies, and laws directed at air and water pollution
69
proved ineffectual. More fundamentally, people did not think of air,
water, and soil pollution as all parts of a larger environmental
problem. This neglect started to change in the 1960s, partly due to the
acceptance of ecological thinking through the writings of Barry
Commoner, Rachel Carson, Paul Ehrlich, and others who made clear
to the public the connections between environmental health and our
70
well-being. Part was due also to the graphic power of seeing the
71
earth from space—a fragile orb without borders. And part was due
to forward-thinking lawyers who created strategies to use the law for
environmental protection.
As Professor Richard Lazarus has documented, at the earliest
meetings to discuss legal strategies for environmental protection, the
participants “deliberately resisted ‘any attempt to define
environmental law’ and speculated that the best theory ‘might well be
67. Jay D. Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
260, 260 (2006).
68. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P.
LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 63 (6th ed. 2009); see
also E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 315–18 (1985)
(tracing the development of environmental law from common-law to public-regulatory-law
models).
69. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 88–89 (recalling that nineteenth-century state
and local environmental ordinances “were poorly coordinated and rarely enforced”); Elliott et
al., supra note 68, at 317 (“For two centuries, the effects of industrial pollution on the natural
environment had been generally free from regulation by government . . . .”).
70. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 90 (discussing examples of events that raised
public concern about environmental issues).
71. See, e.g., Steve Connor, Isn’t That Something, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 10, 2009, at 13
(“Earthrise, December 1968—the first picture of our world taken from space was published 40
years ago this week and still retains its haunting power. . . .”).
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that there is nothing at all unique about environmental law.’” To
paraphrase Judge Easterbrook, they envisioned environmental law as
a Law of the Horse. As noted before, the term “environmental law”
73
did not even exist until 1969.
In short order, though, a “[r]evolution in [l]aw” happened in the
74
1970s.
Policymakers, lawyers, activists, and legal scholars
purposively forged a distinct regime with its own statutes, institutions,
75
and guiding principles. What is recognized today as the field of
environmental law would not have materialized as such if these actors
had instead listed all the issues concerning the environment and
divvied them up to existing fields of practice and policy.
How well does the Stationarity Assessment model explain this
history? The first step is to identify the envelope of variability on
which the field’s assumptions are based. As noted above, prior to the
1970s the bulk of pollution control was handled through the common
76
law, particularly through nuisance doctrine. Nuisance law worked
well so long as pollution conflicts were local, the causes and effects
77
straightforward, and remedies simple to design and administer. By

72. LAZARUS, supra note 22, at 48.
73. Id. at 47.
74. See id. at 67–97.
75. In his sweeping assessment of the origins and coherence of environmental law as a
field, Professor Tarlock recounts the audacity of the field’s early visionaries:
What we now call environmental law is very much embedded in the legal landscape.
The area has developed in an astonishingly short period of time as a result of the rise
of environmentalism as a political force in the late 1960s. The field was created
virtually out of whole cloth by a receptive Judiciary and Congress. In the 1960s,
environmental protection was a marginal political idea. Lawyers followed the great
common law tradition left open to socially marginal groups and pursued a “rule of
law litigation” strategy. To discipline public agencies through what we now call
“public interest” litigation, they had to convince courts that something called
environmental law existed, when in fact it did not. Creative lawyers used a few
meager precedents and vague, seldom applied statutes to convince courts that public
agencies had a duty to consider “environmental” interests and to take steps to avoid
or mitigate adverse “environmental” impacts. Lawyers skillfully created the fiction
that the recognition of new environmental protection duties merely required courts to
perform their traditional and constitutionally legitimate function of applying and
enforcing, rather than creating, pre-existing rules.
A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 213, 215–16 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
76. See supra Part I.B.2.
77. As one leading property-law casebook observes, for example, “nuisance litigation is illsuited to other than small-scale, incidental, localized, scientifically uncomplicated pollution
problems.” JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL H.
SCHILL, PROPERTY 759 (7th ed. 2010); see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 75 (“When
numerous and diverse pollutants emanating from widely dispersed sources affect large
populations, the common law is a poor vehicle for providing redress . . . .”).
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the late 1960s, however, it was clear that pollution conflicts had gone
beyond the assumptions about the envelope of variability for scale
and complexity. Modern environmental problems were by then
“typified . . . by continuing and multiple causes, widespread effects
and multiple victims, and scientifically complex issues as to cause,
78
effect, and remedy.”
Could nuisance law respond to this expanded envelope of
variability in scale and complexity—could it effectively manage
modern pollution problems as a tort? The law might have adapted
through innovations in class actions, attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs suing
“in the public interest,” environmental courts, and similar
79
incremental changes. But the strong sense was that this internal
adaptive approach would not suffice—a transformation was needed
that would shift pollution problems from the common law to public
regulatory law. As Professor Lazarus has described, the “essential
premise of much environmental law is . . . that the physical
characteristics of the ecosystem generate spatial and temporal
spillovers that require restrictions on the private use of natural
resources far beyond those contemplated by centuries-old common
80
law tort rules.”
This transition was spelled out in the famous case of Boomer v.
81
Atlantic Cement Co., in which New York’s highest court declined to
enjoin a cement plant’s air emissions found to constitute a nuisance,
ruling instead that a damages remedy, previously not available under
82
New York law, was the more efficient approach. Though the case is
known mostly for its shift in nuisance remedial doctrine (clear
evidence of the need for adaptation), the court’s rationale for backing
off injunctive relief sent a loud message to courts and legislatures that
a transformative approach ultimately would be necessary. As the
court warned in its timely decision from 1970:
It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will
depend on technical research in great depth; on a carefully balanced
consideration of the economic impact of close regulation; and of the
actual effect on public health. It is likely to require massive public

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 77, at 759.
Id.
LAZARUS, supra note 22, at 121.
Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
Id. at 875.
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expenditure and to demand more than any local community can
accomplish and to depend on regional and interstate controls.
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of
private litigation . . . . This is an area beyond the circumference of
one private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and
should not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute
83
between property owners . . . .

The date of the opinion, not coincidentally, marks the advent of
the modern era of environmental law and of the wave of federal
legislation regulating air, water, and land pollution. The court argued
that reliance on private nuisance actions would be “grossly
inadequate for resolving the more typical pollution problems faced by
84
modern industrialized societies.” Add to this the poor fit between
nuisance law and the rising tide of environmental values reflected in
natural-resource management such as endangered species, loss of
wetlands, biodiversity conservation, and predecision impact
assessment, and it is no surprise that nuisance law gave way to the
modern environmental law regime, as the Stationarity Assessment
model predicts it would.
We can trace a more recent history through the formation of the
field of environmental justice. During the explosion of environmental
laws in the 1970s, the focus had been on reducing aggregate pollution
levels. Little or no thought was given to the distributional impacts of
85
environmental protection. This began to change in the early 1980s

83. Id. at 871.
84. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 75. The common law simply could not handle the
new expanded stationarity regime of the modern pollution problem, “which is why
environmental law evolved beyond those principles to fill the gap with detailed standards and
regulatory controls.” LAZARUS, supra note 22, at 134. There is continued debate, however, over
whether the common law is this ineffective as a mechanism for controlling pollution. For a
collection of articles debating the point, see generally Symposium, Common Law
Environmental Protection, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 575 (2008).
85. As an illustrative example, in 1971 the Sierra Club surveyed its members on their
interest in having the Club address social-justice issues. “When asked, forty-one percent of the
members ‘strongly disagreed’ with the statement that the Club should ‘actively involve itself in
the conservation problems of such special groups as the urban poor and the ethnic minorities.’”
Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and
“Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 262 (1997) (quoting the Sierra Club survey); see also Richard
J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental
Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 788 (1993) (“Largely ignored in the celebration that
accompanied the passage of a series of ambitious environmental protection laws during [the
1970s] were those distinct voices within minority communities that questioned the value of
environmentalism to their communities.”).
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with, in particular, high-profile opposition by an African-American
community in North Carolina to a hazardous waste landfill sited for
86
Warren County.
A series of studies by the United Church of Christ’s Commission
for Racial Justice and the U.S. General Accounting Office found
strong correlations between communities’ racial and economic
87
characteristics and their proximity to hazardous-waste landfills.
Further studies reached similar conclusions—locally undesirable land
uses were disproportionately located near minority or low-income
88
communities. Correlations were ultimately shown for exposure to air
pollution, lead poisoning, pesticides, occupational hazards, and both
89
the stringency and speed of enforcement actions.
It is important to recognize that, prior to the late 1980s, the term
“environmental justice” did not exist. By 1990, though, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had created the
Environmental Equity Workgroup to examine the distributional
90
issues raised by environmental policies and enforcement. In 1994,
the Clinton administration issued an Executive Order directed at
91
federal actions and environmental justice. Today, considering the
distributional impacts of environmental protection has become
commonplace.
One might conclude from its name that environmental justice is
an integral component of environmental law. In fact, however, it
largely operates from the outside—it arose to police environmental
policy and to ensure the just distribution of benefits and burdens—

86. See J.B. RUHL, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, JAMES SALZMAN & ALEXANDRA B. KLASS,
THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 25 (2d ed. 2010).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Environmental Justice: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
91. Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and LowIncome Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1994 & Supp. V 1998). This order creates an interagency working group from the
heads of many agencies and departments. Id. § 1-102. They are charged to provide guidance for
identifying regulations that produce disproportionate impacts on the health or environmental
quality for minority or low-income populations. Id. §§ 1-102 to -103. Agencies are also charged
to come up with plans for avoiding such impacts. Id. § 1-103. As with all executive orders, this
creates no rights enforceable in a court of law. Id. § 6-609.

RUHL & SALZMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2013 4:14 PM

2013] CLIMATE CHANGE MEETS LAW OF THE HORSE

1001
92

and thus has not been assimilated within environmental statutes.
93
94
Unlike the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act, there is no single
“Environmental Justice Act.” Instead, over time, environmental
justice has grown into an overarching field of law and policy,
examining decisions made in many fields including environmental,
land use, and urban development and expressed in the law through
executive orders, administrative guidance, and agency licensing and
95
permitting procedures.
How well does the Stationarity Assessment model explain this
history? The basic assumption (Step 1) throughout the 1970s’ creation
of modern environmental law had been that the new statutes either
had no distributional inequities or were irrelevant. Protests over siting
decisions and studies of the demographics of locally undesirable land
uses starting in the 1980s, however, demonstrated that these were
96
false assumptions. The assumed envelope of variability—that
environmental law did not need to concern itself with distributional
impacts—was blown apart (Step 2). In time, it became apparent that a
new field of environmental justice was necessary (Step 3) because
environmental law had not been designed to be self-aware or self-

92. As Professors Verchick and Hall explain,
[A] specific charge to pursue environmental justice is all but nonexistent in the
nation’s vast armada of federal environmental statutes. It’s not that our
environmental statutes reject environmental justice, or that they are necessarily
inconsistent with it (although some have considered the point). Rather, the laws were
not developed with this priority in mind.
Robert R.M. Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting to Climate Change While Planning for Disaster:
Footholds, Rope Lines, and the Iowa Floods, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2203, 2224–25 (footnotes
omitted).
93. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
94. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
95. For a broad overview of environmental justice law in its present forms, see generally
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PLAN EJ 2014: LEGAL TOOLS (2012), available at
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014/ej-legal-tools.pdf.
96. See UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST JUSTICE & WITNESS MINISTRIES, TOXIC WASTES
AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987–2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.ucc.org/justice/
pdfs/toxic20.pdf (stating that protests objecting to the racially inequitable Warren County waste
site were the initial catalyst for creating a report on environmental justice); see also LUKE W.
COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE
RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 54–55 (2000) (“Since the 1960s,
researchers have analyzed the distribution of numerous environmental hazards: garbage dumps,
air pollution, lead poisoning, toxic waste production and disposal, pesticide poisoning, noise
pollution, occupational hazards, and rat bites. Their overwhelming conclusion is that these
environmental hazards are inequitably distributed by income or race.”).
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policing for distributional impacts, nor could it be trusted to do so
fairly. The field that has emerged is quite different from most
environmental law—more procedural than substantive, more a
framework of analytical questions than of command-and-control
statutory provisions.
By contrast, consider the more relevant example of oceanmanagement policy. At the domestic level, this also operates as a Law
of the Horse, but everyone recognizes that is suboptimal. In recent
years, two blue-ribbon commissions on ocean policy have both
demonstrated that ocean ecosystems are suffering under a
combination of threats that require more focused legal and policy
97
attention. Steps 1 and 2 of the Stationarity Assessment model have
been triggered, but altering or abandoning the current structure for a
more holistic legal structure has not happened, and likely will not
happen, because the legal regime has become too entrenched to
98
shift.
It may prove infeasible to forge a new field of climate adaptation
law. Mindful of the oceans example, though, it would be unwise not
to consider at an early point in the development of climate adaptation
policy how the law should evolve. The remainder of this Article is
dedicated to this consideration.
II. STATIONARITY ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAW
Although we are the first to propose using the Stationarity
Assessment model as a method for evaluating the impacts of climate
change on law, other scholars have already been asking some of the
99
same questions that the model incorporates. These inquiries have
ranged from focused studies of fields, such as water law, resource100
conservation law, and human rights law, to broader expositions on
climate change adaptation as an agent of legal change in areas such as

97. See Studley, supra note 25, at 109–13 (detailing the creation of ocean-policy
commissions by both the Bush and Obama administrations).
98. It is interesting to note that law for horses never progressed beyond Steps 1 and 2.
Assumptions about horses and their activities have not changed, so the pressures for a new field
have never coalesced. No one is heard demanding the creation of a distinct field of horse law to
manage all of the legal issues having to do with horses. Law for horses remains a Law of the
Horse.
99. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 6, at 16–18 (responding to questions regarding whether the
stationarity model is an accurate and effective assumption in the face of changed conditions
resulting from climate change and suggesting what an alternative model should look like).
100. See supra note 6.
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101

These studies also have produced a range of
federalism.
conclusions, from predictions that different fields of law can evolve to
102
accommodate climate change impacts,
to concerns that the
distortion of stationarity assumptions will be so profound as to
103
demand revolutionary changes across crosscutting swaths of law. To
evaluate those conclusions, we present a case study of climate change
adaptation in a coastal region. We then step back to assess what this
suggests for the development and organization of climate change law
and policy.
A. Stationarity Assessment Case Study
The biophysical effects of increasing atmospheric greenhouse-gas
concentrations will be uneven around the globe and within the United
104
States. The principal impacts and their core set of environmental
consequences are well understood—rising mean surface temperature,
ocean acidification and warming, rising sea level, and changes in
105
precipitation patterns. Many biophysical consequences of these
primary drivers are also well understood, such as changes in the
variability and intensity of storm events, migration of species to adjust
to changed conditions, changes in flood and drought patterns, and
106
shifts in ecosystem regimes.
Nonetheless, the socioeconomic
impacts of climate change and the adaptation responses needed to
manage them are difficult to anticipate at local scales. Climate change
researchers have constructed rough scenarios for many regions,
however, and cities and states are beginning to develop adaptation107
planning processes. Synthesizing from that body of work, we

101. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 6, at 391–432.
102. See J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time,
73 LA. L. REV. 69 (2012) (exploring likely evolutions in property law in response to sea-level
rise); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the NoAnalog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 59–62 (2008) (suggesting several ways that the existing
endangered-species regime can meet its goals in the face of climate change).
103. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
104. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2; U.S.
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2.
105. Cf. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 17–40 (explaining
various phenomena associated with climate change and their predicted environmental impacts).
106. Cf. id. at 41–106 (explaining some of the effects of climate change on ecosystems).
107. See Vicki Arroyo & Terri Cruce, State and Local Adaptation, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 15, at
569 (stating that state and local leaders are taking action to adapt to changing climatic
conditions based on regional predictions of climate change effects).
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develop a plausible local climate change scenario here to apply the
Stationarity Assessment model in a dynamic legal adaptation context.
Drawing from a number of assessments of climate change
108
impacts, our case study focuses on a hypothetical coastal city in the
United States and its adjoining rural areas. The region enjoys a classic
four-season climate and all of the recreational activities such a climate
makes possible. The city has a thriving harbor area and busy
waterfront business and entertainment districts. Local surface
reservoirs and groundwater aquifers provide ample water for
residential and commercial uses. Not far from the city along the coast
is a large wildlife-refuge area rich in coastal estuarine wetlands and an
abundance of waterfowl. A significant fishery industry operates just
offshore. Inland of the city one finds a large agricultural district. The
farms raise a variety of crops and livestock and have ample water
supply from natural precipitation combined with water withdrawals
from rivers augmented by snowmelt runoff from a nearby mountain
region. Abundant public parks provide recreational opportunities. In
general, life is good in this corner of the world.
What will happen to our idyllic coastal region as climate change
continues on its present course? Assume that in this region surface
temperatures continue rising, the sea level continues rising, and
overall precipitation levels fall but intense precipitation events
become more common. To put pressure on the legal system for
purposes of our Stationarity Assessment, a plausible worst-case
scenario of biophysical and socioeconomic changes and likely
adaptive responses can be constructed around the region’s various
sectors.
Urban: The central city, focused on its harbor economy and
thriving commercial districts, faces the dire threats of rising sea levels
and more frequent and intense storm events. These effects will
threaten the integrity of the waterfront infrastructure and buildings
and pose increased flooding risks to the central city as a whole. Rising
108. We have synthesized our case study from analyses provided in several leading national
and state impact-assessment and adaptation-planning studies. See generally CAL. NATURAL
RES. AGENCY, supra note 5; GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GRP., FINAL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR: A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE
(2008), available at http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/GBLWRM/docs/CCIGReport08Web.pdf;
MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION REPORT (2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/energy/cca/eeaclimate-adaptation-report.pdf; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2. Our
goal is not to document a particular climate change outcome, but rather to construct a plausible
regional scenario from which to assess legal adaptation.
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temperatures will lead to increased demand for cooling of buildings
and cars in warm seasons, though heating demand will fall in cooler
seasons. More frequent heat waves will threaten sensitive
populations, though fewer intense cold snaps will alleviate a different
source of health concerns. Increased temperatures could also allow
introduction of disease-bearing insects and other vectors. Reduced
overall precipitation will decrease reservoir supplies, and sea-level
rise will pose the risk of saltwater intrusion to water supply aquifers.
Depending on relative conditions in other urban areas, climateinduced human migration may lead to substantial positive or negative
population shifts.
Possible adaptive responses to these changed conditions include
a wide range of approaches. Sea-level rise and storm-surge events
could be combated through the construction of seawalls and other
water-barrier structures, or the waterfront infrastructure could be
abandoned and replaced further inland in protected areas. Rising
energy demands in warm seasons likely will lead to efforts to increase
peak energy capacity as well as to develop new production
technologies and conservation methods. Health concerns associated
with heat and disease will require increased public-health capacities.
Decreasing water supplies will demand more effective waterconservation methods and put pressure on local authorities to locate
new sources of water.
Agricultural: Warming temperatures will increase the length of
growing seasons, but may also introduce new agricultural crop pests,
weeds, and livestock diseases. Some crops and livestock will not
tolerate the new temperature regime, but farmers may be able to
replace them with other suitable varieties. Rising temperatures will
also reduce precipitation in the mountain region and cause earlier
snowmelt events, thus altering the availability of irrigation water from
the region’s rivers. Reduced overall precipitation also will strain
water availability, threatening the viability of some crops and
livestock. Increased frequency and intensity of storm events will lead
to increases in crop damage and soil erosion.
Farmers will adapt to these changes by switching to different
crop varieties and, with more difficulty, different livestock. Improved
farming methods could enhance water-use efficiency and protect
crops from storm events. New crops, pests, and weeds may prompt
farmers to use different fertilizers, insecticides, and herbicides. As
with urban water users, decreased agricultural water supplies also will
put pressure on farmers to secure new supplies.
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Coastal and Marine: Rising sea levels will erode shorelines and
inundate existing coastal wetlands, though in some places existing
upland areas will transition into new wetland regimes. Increased
frequency and intensity of storm events will further damage coastal
wetlands and pose flooding risks to coastal properties. Rising ocean
temperatures will affect the viability of valuable fishery species and
allow for the introduction of invasive species and disease-bearing
species. Increasing carbon dioxide concentrations will acidify marine
ecosystems, threatening the integrity of coral reef systems that
provide storm surge protection to coastal lands. Earlier snowmelt
events and more frequent and intense storm events will alter the flow
pattern of nutrients from inland regions to the marine environment.
Although some of the adaptive responses for rural coastal lands
will be similar to those available to the urban area, resources may be
more limited, and thus options such as seawalls and offshore barriers
may be less viable. The fishery industry will have little power over
changes to the local marine species assembly, and thus will be forced
to switch catch targets, to move to other fishing grounds, or to shut
down.
Recreation: Rising temperatures will reduce cold-weather
recreation opportunities while increasing the length of the warmweather recreation season. Increased frequency of heat waves and
storm events, however, will limit warm weather recreation days.
Decreased overall precipitation will limit water-related recreation
such as freshwater boating and skiing in the mountains. Increased
water temperatures could reduce some freshwater recreational
opportunities, such as fishing for a particular species no longer able to
survive in local lakes and rivers. Rising sea levels will inundate the
wildlife refuge wetlands, thus reducing waterfowl populations and any
hunting opportunities associated with them.
Although economically disruptive, recreational providers should
be able to transition to take advantage of the increased warm-season
opportunities while phasing down in the cold season. Ski areas may
no longer be viable in the mountain region, but the warm-weatherrecreation industry in the mountains and along the coast may be
significantly enhanced. The hunting and fishing industries will also
need to adjust to new species and habitat regimes. Public recreation
areas such as the refuge and parks may need to alter infrastructure
and staffing to adjust as well. Overall, however, while recreational
opportunities will change, they will remain abundant and varied.
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Ecosystems: Many species with life patterns keyed to particular
temperature, precipitation, and habitat regimes may find the region’s
new set of conditions unsuitable. Some of those species will migrate,
while those unable to migrate will face increasing stress. Other
species more suited to the new set of conditions will thrive, however,
and some species not previously found in the region will migrate to it.
Increasing temperatures and decreasing precipitation will combine to
cause more fire events. At a more fundamental level, basic ecosystem
processes such as nutrient cycling and decomposition will be altered.
Some ecosystems, faced with all of these threats, will transition into
entirely different regimes supporting significantly altered species
assemblies and providing altered streams of ecosystem services to
human populations.
Ecosystem-resource managers will have difficulty adapting to
these effects if their goal is to maintain a prescribed set of ecosystem
conditions, as may be the case for the wildlife refuge or a wilderness
area. It would be futile, for example, to attempt to halt the outmigration of species, and it would be a resource-intensive challenge to
attempt to barricade ecosystems against in-migration. Even more
challenging would be efforts to keep basic ecosystem processes
unchanged. Preservation, in other words, will become an increasingly
unattainable management goal, meaning that adaptive responses
must focus on transition goals such as maintaining overall biodiversity
or overall ecosystem service benefits.
This collection of scenarios is, admittedly, rather grim. But it is
based on entirely plausible assumptions about climate change and its
worst biophysical and socioeconomic impacts. To be sure, many other
109
sets of plausible assumptions exist with less dire consequences, but
our intention is to explore the strongest possible case for
transformative legal change.
B. Assessment of Legal Fields
Climate change adaptation inevitably will demand the services of
law and legal institutions, but that does not necessarily lead to the
demand for changes in the law. The Stationarity Assessment model
identifies one potential source of demand for legal transformation—
significant disruption of the law’s assumptions about physical, social,
and economic conditions. Professor Holly Doremus, for example, has
109. See J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN. L. REV.
206, 217–41 (2012) (reviewing the range of climate change harms and benefits).
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suggested that because “[c]limate change will unsettle expectations
about both land and water,” it follows that “[c]hanges to underlying
110
property rights will be needed.”
As we described in the Introduction, the demands of climate
change adaptation will implicate different fields of law differently.
Family law jumps out as a legal field that appears to be relatively
untouched by climate change. We have not rigged our case study to
work family law out of the picture. One would have to contrive a farfetched story to identify novel legal issues that climate change could
present for family law—indeed, we cannot think of one and have
found no evidence anyone else has. But family law is not alone in this
respect. Other fields of law similarly untouched include criminal law,
commercial transactions, consumer law, products liability law, tax
law, banking and finance law, constitutional law, administrative law,
telecommunications law, and food and drug law, to name just a few.
Take any of these fields and work it through the Stationarity
Assessment model. We will use criminal law as an example. It is
difficult to articulate any assumption that criminal law makes about
the variability of natural, social, or economic conditions that will be
disrupted in any substantial sense by climate change. Perhaps certain
kinds of crime, such as looting, are associated with natural events
such as hurricanes and floods. Yet how criminal law manages such
crimes is in no sense based on assumptions about the range of
variability of hurricanes and floods. To the extent that any
adjustments are needed by the legal system to respond to novel
crimes associated with the effects of climate change, criminal law will
adapt to manage them.
To be sure, climate change adaptation will be a medium within
which legal issues in criminal law and many other fields arise—one
can envision crimes involving bid-rigging for sea-wall construction,
intellectual property issues involving patents for new weatherproofing
technologies, and products liability issues involving climate
adaptation products. But those circumstances present no pressure for
the law to adapt any more than do bid-rigging for subway
construction, a patent for a new electronic device, or an injury from a
defective kitchen product. They are simply new fact patterns to plug
into the existing legal doctrine and practice. In all such cases the
Stationarity Assessment comes up negative—to the extent these fields

110. Doremus, supra note 64, at 1091.
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of law make any assumptions about the range of variability for
conditions likely to be affected by climate change, novel legal issues
arising from climate change will fit within their interstices.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are fields such as water law
that are likely to confront sets of conditions with no, or at best weak,
analogs in existing doctrine and practice. Water-law scholars, for
example, have argued that their field faces tremendous pressure to
change in response to climate change, and our case study offers no
111
reason to doubt them. The changes in precipitation patterns and the
availability of the right quality and quantity of water could thrust the
agricultural and urban populations into a water competition like none
they have experienced. Indeed, the region as a whole may find itself
competing with other regions for new supplies and negotiating with
yet other regions—regions suddenly in water abundance—for water
transfers.
What makes family law and water law so different in this
respect? We believe the answer lies in their respective stationarity
assumptions. Water law is, at bottom, about water scarcity, and the
natural-water system is in store for a tremendous amount of change.
Family law, by contrast, is not about a biophysical system. Nor are the
other fields in the long list suggested previously. The legal fields most
exposed to adaptive pressures from climate change, in other words,

111. A growing number of water-law scholars have argued that climate change adaptation
will demand fundamental reforms of domestic water-allocation law and water-property rights.
See generally, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Balancing Compassion and Risk in Climate Change
Adaptation: U.S. Water, Drought, and Agricultural Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 201 (2012) (examining
the complex tradeoffs between compensation, risk allocation, and risk reduction as adaptation
strategies for agricultural regions where more severe drought regimes are expected); Adell
Amos, Freshwater Conservation in the Context of Energy and Climate Policy: Assessing Progress
and Identifying Challenges in Oregon and the Western United States, 12 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 1 (2008); John T. Andrews, Jessica Roberts Pearson & John K. Woodling, California
Water Management: Subject to Change, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1463 (2008);
Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Law to Public Necessity: Reframing Climate Change as
Emergency Response and Preparedness, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 709 (2010); Joseph W. Dellapenna,
Climate Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water Law Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383
(2008); Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamic Water Management
in the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 55 (2007); Brian E. Gray, Global Climate
Change: Water Supply Risks and Water Management Opportunities, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1453 (2008); Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stuntz & Robert H. Abrams, Climate
Change and Freshwater Resources, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2008, at 30; Kathleen A.
Miller, Climate Change and Water in the West: Complexities, Uncertainties and Strategies for
Adaptation, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 87 (2007); A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law
Reform in West Virginia: The Broader Context, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 495 (2004).

RUHL & SALZMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2013 4:14 PM

1010

[Vol. 62:975

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

are those resting deeply on stationarity assumptions about biophysical
systems. In addition to environmental law and water law, land use
law, agricultural law, insurance law, and littoral-property rights easily
come to mind as fields heavily dependent on assumptions about how
the biophysical world works and, most critically, about its envelopes
of variability. Rock that world and you could rock those fields of law.
Consider, for example, ways in which each of the following fields
could be significantly disrupted in our coastal region case study:
o

Environmental Law. Ecological change could render
meaningless habitat protections for species and management
goals for wildlife refuges.

o

Water Law. Extreme shifts in water supplies could undermine
long-standing prior appropriation water law doctrines.

o

Land Use Law. Sea-level rise could lead to demands for intense
restriction of coastal development and for shifting development
priorities to rural inland areas.

o

Agricultural Law. Farms may demand greater flexibility in their
use of chemicals through changes to pesticide laws.

o

Insurance Law. Questions may arise about coverage of damages
from climate related events and the adequacy of insureds’
adaptive measures.

o

Littoral-Property Rights. Sea-level rise may present difficult legal
issues about the public-private ownership divide along the coast.

Of course, change is an inherent factor in all of these fields:
humans have altered ecosystems through agriculture for millennia,
droughts and floods affect water supplies, development patterns shift
with changes in technology, new pests arrive in agricultural districts,
contaminated soil presents new issues for insurance law, and
coastlines have long shifted around. But climate change is different,
very different, in both the quantity and quality of change likely to be
introduced into biophysical systems. Hurricanes hit the coast, and
tides shift where the beach ends, but an extra foot of sea level and ten
more hurricanes a year could put a coastal system well outside its
historic range of variability.
What does that mean for fields intimately connected with
biophysical conditions? It is tempting to move quickly to the
conclusion that such fields necessarily will have to adapt to the
changes in natural systems, but the Stationarity Assessment model
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demands a more deliberate analysis. It is not enough to observe that
nature will change; one also has to evaluate how much variability in
nature these fields of law are designed to tolerate. Given the natural
range of variability even without climate change, fields like
environmental law are accustomed to dramatic swings of doctrinal
and institutional change.
Indeed, the history of environmental law is largely one of
continuous change to adapt to changes in its physical and social
contexts. For example, by the mid-1990s—just two decades into the
life of modern environmental law—lawyers broadly discussed the
development of “second generation” approaches to manage the
112
widening and ever-changing array of environmental problems.
Similarly, change in water law, even radical change, is nothing new.
The classic laws of appropriative rights in the West and of riparian
rights in the East have undergone significant evolution in many states
113
over time to reflect social and economic change. Yet with all of
these changes, environmental law is still environmental law, and
water law is still water law.
Let us dig deeper into environmental law to drive this point
home. What is it about climate change that is going to throw
environmental law something it has never seen, something completely
outside the box, something it just cannot handle? We think the
answer is, nothing. To be sure, climate change will change the
environment in many ways: sea-level rise will inundate coastal
wetlands and erode beaches, fire regimes will change, some areas will
have more water and some less, species will migrate, people will
migrate, it will grow warmer everywhere. But so what? In particular,
so what for environmental law? Environmental law has been
operating for decades in all of those contexts. It is not as if the loss of

112. By the mid-1990s “virtually everyone . . . agree[d] that our historical command-andcontrol approach [was] inefficient and inadequate by itself to carry us where we still need to
go.” Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Foreword, The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 15 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. viii, viii (1996). For the leading contemporaneous accounts of the emergence of the
second generation alternatives, see generally Dennis Hirsch, Second Generation Policy and the
New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003); and Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation
of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001).
113. See generally Joseph Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century,
106 W. VA. L. REV. 539 (2004); Joseph Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the
Southeastern States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 9 (2002); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 769 (2002).
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wetlands, erosion of beaches, fire or its absence, wet or dry areas,
invasive species, people moving around, and it being hot outside are
anything new to environmental law. It is more likely that peoples’
priorities may change and environmental law’s position at the table of
114
policymaking may grow more or less important, but it will still be
environmental law. Consider how each of the six fields of law
mentioned above could adapt to biophysical change and still retain its
basic form and substance:
o

Environmental law. Conservation areas can adopt new, more
fluid management goals, such as managing for overall
biodiversity rather than for specific biomes or species.

o

Water law. The doctrine can incorporate specialized rules for
extreme periods of drought and for accommodating innovations
such as water markets.

o

Land use law. State and local authorities can adopt specialized
rules for areas threatened most by sea-level rise and embed them
within existing zoning- and growth-management regimes.

o

Agricultural law. With assistance from and monitoring by federal
and state agencies, farms in climate-transition zones can
carefully shift to new practices.

o

Insurance law. Coverage issues can be worked out through
gradual industry refinements to and judicial interpretations of
coverage policies.

o

Littoral-property rights. State courts and legislatures can adopt
specialized rules of littoral property that resolve sea-level-rise
issues while fitting within the broader existing regime of littoral
rights.

With or without climate change, in other words, fields like these
are inherently dynamic, and all indications are that change remains in
their future. This is not to say that change comes easily to these fields.
Often it is tumultuous and controversial. But change does come
naturally to them—they are designed to change. They transform, but
they do not crumble.

114. See Ruhl, supra note 6 (examining how public demand for adaptation measures such as
water supply and protection from more intense storm, drought, and fire events could diminish
the priority for environmental protection).
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C. Calling a Horse a Horse
Put simply, when one steps back and applies the Stationarity
Assessment model to evaluate likely implications of climate change
adaptation to the full span of legal fields, it is difficult to identify more
than a few that will face pressure to change. The legal response to
climate change adaptation will be evolutionary rather than
revolutionary for the vast majority of legal fields. Most of law and
legal institutions will see climate change adaptation as just another set
of challenging issues to work through the system, and it will be easy
work at that.
The short list of fields mentioned above, all sharing the common
trait of resting deeply on assumptions about the stationarity of
biophysical system variability, will have to work harder, maybe much
harder, to adapt, and one or two might buckle under the pressure and
go through transformational change. But this is far from certain.
After all, land use law has imposed sharp restrictions on development
in many other contexts, such as restrictions against (or mandating)
the use or density of buildings in certain areas to serve a broad variety
115
of public purposes. Climate change adaptation would just be a new
purpose. And environmental law has already begun adapting through
116
has
specialized doctrines. Thus the Endangered Species Act
addressed species threatened by climate change (for example, the
polar bear) and appears capable of responding to climate impacts
117
without need of sweeping doctrinal change. There is no reason to
assume the core legal doctrines and practices of either of these fields
or the others mentioned above will require sweeping transformation
as the impacts of climate change become more severe.
Overall, therefore, a field-specific assessment of climate impacts
suggests that climate change adaptation may well follow the path of
the Law of the Horse. Specific fields will adapt on their own as
challenges arise, with no need for a new field. Calling it climate
adaptation law might make it suitable for a “law and” seminar in law
schools or conference for practitioners, but not as a distinctly
coherent operating field of law. Although this might be the most
probable trajectory, however, it is not at all clear this would be the
most desirable course of development. In Parts III and IV of this
115. See DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 69–133 (5th ed. 2008).
116. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
117. See supra note 102.
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Article, therefore, we evaluate the possibility and the potential
contours of forging a distinct field of climate adaptation law.
III. JUSTIFYING AN INTERVENTION
The preceding analysis suggests that the disruptive effects of
adapting to climate change are unlikely to undermine the doctrinal
substance and institutional architecture of most legal fields. The
possible exceptions include those fields that depend heavily on
biophysical assumptions, and even for them it is not clear that
fundamental transformations will be necessary. The implication is
that a new field of climate adaptation law and policy is unlikely to
evolve incrementally on its own.
Though an important finding, it does not end the analysis. The
question remains whether there is merit in trying purposively to
create a field, of intervening to alter the likely default trajectory
toward a Law of the Horse. It is well worth recalling that
environmental law faced a similar crossroads in its early days. A Lawof-the-Horse approach was entirely possible, but it was rejected in
favor of creating a new field that ultimately boasted its own statutes,
agencies, and core principles such as internalizing externalities, risk
management, and public involvement.
In retrospect, this was both outrageously ambitious and, by many
measures, outrageously effective. Does it make sense to emulate this
ambition and purposively intervene to create a distinct field for
climate change adaptation? Motivated by that question, in Parts III
and IV we explore what would justify and comprise a distinct law of
climate change adaptation. The first step is to examine what a Lawof-the-Horse approach risks missing and what is really at stake in
climate adaptation policy.
A. Changing the Scale of Stationarity Assessment
If, as we conclude, the Law of the Horse appears to be the
natural path for law in response to climate change, what would justify
an intervention to change that path? After all, we concluded in Part II
that the vast majority of legal fields come through the Stationarity
Assessment basically unscathed, and the few that will take some hits
are likely to remain standing. Why is anything more needed? The
answer lies in the scale at which the Stationarity Assessment is
applied.
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Looking at climate change adaptation through the eyes of a
single field of law allows careful analysis of the envelope of variability
within which the field operates and on which its assumptions are
based. Predicting the extent to which climate change will alter that
envelope then allows one to consider how effectively the field’s
stationarity-based designs of the past will work in the climate change
future. Focusing on one field of law thus identifies how assumptions
of stationarity may break down for that field and allows for
comparisons between fields to assess which are likely to undergo
greater pressure to adapt or, at the extreme, to snap.
The disadvantage of the field-specific approach, however, is its
failure to capture the cumulative effect of numerous intersecting fields
undergoing stress on their respective stationarity-based foundations.
It is one thing to observe that a field of law has managed change in
the past and that climate change merely provides for similar
evolution, albeit possibly at more frequent intervals or intense
magnitudes. From this perspective, climate change adaptation may
only require the field to work harder, with tinkering here and there.
In settings relevant to climate change adaptation, such as
agriculture or coastal land use, the field-specific approach may
suggest that each field comes through the Stationarity Assessment
reasonably intact. But there is a further level of analysis needed. The
aggregate effect of each field feeling moderate stress from climate
change could lead to undetected cracks in the stationarity-based
foundation of the system of fields working together. The most
challenging climate adaptation questions are likely to be derived from
complex environmental, social, and economic conditions that
intersect across numerous fields. Viewed this way, climate change
adaptation may demand more crosscutting responses from law than
the field-specific focus led us to conclude.
It may not be, in other words, that climate adaptation law
develops to replace any particular field but, rather, emerges to
manage how those fields interact at scales relevant to climate
adaptation decisionmaking. Decisions in these contexts will demand
difficult policy tradeoffs and trigger different sets of questions
depending on which way policy moves.
Consider, for example, the problem of domestic migration as
people facing water scarcity, intense storms, and heat waves search
for more hospitable environs. Widely regarded as a “complex
challenge” of the climate change future, such migration waves will
implicate “eight basic risks: loss of land, employment, shelter, and

RUHL & SALZMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2013 4:14 PM

1016

[Vol. 62:975

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

access to common resources; economic marginalization; increased
morbidity and mortality; food insecurity; and negative cultural and
118
psychological impacts.” On a more local scale, consider this
description of the hard choices that San Francisco, much like our case
study’s hypothetical coastal city, will confront as it begins to plan for
sea-level rise:
[How to adapt to sea-level rise] presents enormously complex policy
and economic issues both for existing communities and new
development. There are several strategies for responding [to] sea
level rise, ranging from protection (raising or building levees), to
building “resilient” structures, to precluding new development in
flood-prone areas, to abandoning existing built-up areas and
retreating from the rising waters. The favored approach depends not
only on the specific circumstances, but also on one’s point of view
119
regarding which values to protect.

The choices among these options will have profound implications
for and will lean heavily on land use controls, housing policy, publicand private-insurance providers, public-health services, coastalecosystem protection, emergency response, and public-infrastructure
design and finance. Although it may be comforting to think that each
of these legal fields can handle its piece of the policy dynamic, is there
cause for concern that not all of the policy questions have been
adequately addressed? We believe there is.
Of course, many coastal cities have had to deal on a regular basis
with the realities of the coastal environment, including whether to
promote or restrict coastal barriers and how much to regulate coastal
development. But few cities have had to wrestle with whether they
should finance and construct an enormous seawall system the length
of the city’s coastline, or retrofit all buildings and infrastructure to
have greater resilience to floods, or just pack it up and move the
entire city inland. Some of the legal fields working on the problem,
for example, may experience much stronger interactions, such as the
potential for land use decisions (moving inland) to put constraints on
water-management decisions (how to get the water supply inland)
and public-safety and health-services policy (how to serve the
population that does not move inland). There may also be gaps in the
118. A. de Sherbinin et al., Preparing for Resettlement Associated with Climate Change, 334
SCIENCE 456, 457 (2011).
119. Zane Gresham & Miles Imwalle, Sea Level Rise: Regulatory Responses in San
Francisco Bay and Across the Globe, TRENDS, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 10, 10.
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law that are exposed by new policy questions, such as what to do if
large numbers of people from other regions move into the area.
Which field handles mass domestic migration? Certainly not
immigration law.
Professors Verchick and Hall, in their work on flood- and stormadaptation policy, have explained how this problem already is
clogging up development of adaptation policy at the federal level:
The cross-sector nature of adaptation makes things even worse.
With so many government sectors having some relationship to
climate resilience, it is unlikely that any single sector-based agency
will “own” the issue. And that is why only a few sector-based
agencies . . . think very much about adaptation at all: it’s someone
else’s problem. Thus few agencies have developed specialized
regulations or guidelines to promote climate resilience. Nor has
Congress broadly directed agencies to focus on adaptation or
120
created specific authorities for them to do so.

Hence, although it may appear that most fields of law look to be
in good shape when subjected to the Stationarity Assessment test,
relying exclusively on field-specific assessments may lead to
unwarranted complacency. So what is to be done?
B. Adaptation as Process, Not Substance
Consider the two basic approaches one could take to designing a
field of climate change adaptation, one substantive and one
procedural. Environmental law can provide a useful example of the
formation of a substantive field. As described above, environmental
law largely supplanted nuisance law as the primary regime for
pollution problems when it became clear that the latter had simply
121
been outstripped by changes in the nature of pollution. Nuisance
law just was not up to the task. In its place, media-specific laws were
adopted with national, uniform standards that would be implemented
122
and enforced by a new environmental agency. Why not follow the
same approach with climate change adaptation?
Developing a substantive body of law and policy for climate
change adaptation may seem to be an attractive strategy at first
glance. It certainly is easy to imagine climate change mitigation,

120. Verchick & Hall, supra note 92, at 2223 (citation omitted).
121. See supra Part I.B.3.
122. See supra Part I.B.3.
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which is guided by simple objectives for pollution control (reducing
greenhouse-gas emissions) and land use (preventing deforestation
and increasing vegetative capacity to sequester carbon). But it is far
less obvious how climate change adaptation translates into a
substantive field of prescriptions and standards. Climate change
adaptation is too crosscutting. Climate change will affect everywhere
one way or another, but it will affect different areas in vastly different
ways. What constitutes successful climate change adaptation will
123
necessarily be different across the landscape. Some areas will be
fighting increased flooding while others fight increased drought.
Moreover, adaptation measures will frequently have vertical and
horizontal transboundary effects. One state adapting to longer
growing seasons with increased irrigation could divert water supplies
from another state facing reduced precipitation, and national waterinfrastructure policy could conflict with either or both states’
124
adaptation goals. It is hard to imagine what a substantive climate
adaptation law would even look like.
Consider also the institutional structure of emerging substantive
fields of law. There is little doubt that the birth of the EPA helped to
legitimize the environmental movement as a recognized field of law.
A climate adaptation agency would face similar challenges
implementing substantive laws. Given the vast breadth of sectors and
activities implicated by climate change adaptation in so many
different ways, it is hard to know what a regulatory body could
meaningfully accomplish. In brief, attempting to construct a
substantive law that could effectively and meaningfully address the
myriad aspects of climate change adaptation seems a fool’s errand.
By contrast, however, for the very reasons a substantive field
would be too unwieldy to manage, a procedural strategy for climate
change adaptation is far easier to envision. Once one considers
systemic decisions that San Francisco and other regions will face—
whether to construct a system of seawalls, to supply or not supply
water to parched areas, or how to move a city inland—the shape of
adaptation law and policy becomes much clearer. At those decision
scales, climate change adaptation is a process. As a process,
moreover, climate change adaptation intersects across many

123. See McDonald, supra note 18, at 288 (“[T]he highly localized nature of climate impacts
also means that adaptation responses must also be tailored to local conditions . . . .”).
124. John H. Davidson, Adapting to Climate Change: Transbasin Water Diversions and an
Example from the Missouri River Valley, 11 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 757 (2010).
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substantive fields. Each discrete substantive issue—how high to build
a seawall or how much water to divert to parched farms—is likely to
match up well with some existing field of law. But none of the existing
fields of law alone or in any combination are well equipped to
manage the emergent process dimensions of climate change
adaptation.
To make this clearer, consider the example of environmental
justice. The need for a field of environmental justice arose precisely
because substantive environmental law was operating as expected.
The problem was that implementation of individual laws, when taken
together, created an unintended problem. There was a systematic bias
at work, as environmental harms and inadequate implementation
125
routinely fell on poor communities of color. This was an emergent
property that would not have been readily apparent in examining
substantive air, water, or hazardous waste laws. It was only in
assessing the process of their combined application that this problem
and its scope became evident. Environmental justice thus focused in
126
large part on identifying and correcting these systemic harms.
In the same way, it may very well be that no existing field of law
is rendered obsolete by climate change, but that more than a Law of
the Horse is needed—that is, a distinct field of climate adaptation
theory and practice is nonetheless necessary and appropriate to
manage policy goals that no individual field can address. This need
arises because the emergent harms from adapting to climate change
are more likely to result from intersecting decisionmaking processes
than from substantive legal doctrines. In simple terms, the difficult
challenges will primarily be at the system level and will invoke the
need for a new procedural field far more than a new substantive field.
IV. DESIGNING A FIELD OF CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
If climate adaptation policy is about process, it follows that
climate adaptation law should be about process. In this Part we
outline the policy goals and implementation mechanisms for a
process-oriented field of climate change adaptation. Although
perhaps not a field of law in the traditional sense of a substantive
body of doctrine, like environmental justice, the new regime we
propose is a procedural overlay—spanning multiple substantive fields

125. See supra Part I.B.2.
126. See supra Part I.B.2.
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to enforce overarching policy goals unlikely to be satisfied sufficiently
were each substantive field left to enforce them independently. In this
Part we outline the goals and mechanisms of such a procedural
overlay for climate adaptation law.
A. Policy Goals
A procedural approach seems to make sense for climate change
adaptation, but with what policy goals in mind? We argue that climate
adaptation law is well suited for implementing three overarching
normative goals lying at the heart of the emerging adaptation policy
dialogue. The first two are reducing vulnerability and increasing
127
128
resilience to climate change. These are related.
Reducing vulnerability seeks to prevent climate change harms.
This can be achieved by improving the reliability of infrastructure and
other mechanisms designed to shield human communities and
ecosystems from the harmful effects of climate change, such as by
constructing sea walls to protect coastal areas or by limiting new
development permits on coasts that are likely to experience sea-level
129
rise. If the risks associated with vulnerability can be reduced

127. Vulnerability refers to “[t]he degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to
cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes,” and
resilience refers to “[a] capability to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from
significant multihazard threats with minimum damage to social well-being, the economy, and
the environment.” INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE, FEDERAL
ACTIONS FOR A CLIMATE RESILIENT NATION 2 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/2011_adaptation_progress_report.pdf.
128. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 720 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg2_report_impacts_adapt
ation_and_vulnerability.htm (“Adaptation to climate change takes place through adjustments to
reduce vulnerability or enhance resilience in response to observed or expected changes in
climate and associated extreme weather events.”); John Handmer & Stephen Dovers, A
Typology of Resilience: Rethinking Institutions for Sustainable Development, in THE
EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 187, 196
(describing resilience and resistance as the opposite extremes of a continuum of possible
responses to climate change); Nathan Hultman, Worth More Than Good Advice: Lessons of
Hurricane Katrina for Development in a Changing Climate, 11 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 47, 49–50
(2006) (“The first steps [in building resilience to natural disasters] involve executing the wellworn mantras of the disaster-relief community: build better protective infrastructure, initiate
and enforce building codes, reduce environmental degradation, set policy to discourage
settlement in vulnerable areas, and coordinate the disaster response to get immediate aid to
those most in need.”).
129. See JONATHAN ENSOR & RACHEL BERGER, UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION: LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES 13–16 (2009) (delineating
three different types of vulnerability to climate change and suggesting adaptations appropriate
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between nations and within nations. More recently, climate change
adaptation has moved to center stage in the international arena, as
poor coastal and small-island nations most in harm’s way argue that
134
the developed world should finance their adaptive measures. Little
attention, however, has been paid to how to equitably allocate
adaptation benefits within the United States, but this is sure to
135
become a highly charged issue.
As an example, consider again our coastal region described in
136
Part II. Vulnerability focuses on protecting inhabitants from more
frequent and intense storm surges and heat waves. Resilience focuses
on recovering from the damage caused by flood and heat-wave events
when they happen. And adaptation equity seeks to ensure that
measures reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience do not
disadvantage specific groups. Much as environmental justice has
sought to enforce equity norms in the implementation of
environmental law and policy, this new field would use the metrics of
vulnerability, resilience, and equity to evaluate decisions about

133. See generally, e.g., Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Global Climate
Change, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 255 (2006); John H. Knox, Climate Change and
Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 165 (2009); John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights
and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477 (2009); Siobhán
McInerney-Lankford, Climate Change and Human Rights: An Introduction to Legal Issues, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 431 (2009); Stephen Tully, The Contribution of Human Rights as an
Additional Perspective on Climate Change Impacts Within the Pacific, 5 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L.
169 (2007).
134. See, e.g., William C. Burns, Global Warming—The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 147, 175 (1997); John Crump, Snow, Sand, Ice, and Sun: Climate Change and Equity in
the Arctic and Small Island Developing States, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2008, at
8, 8–10; Alexander Gillespie, Small Island States in the Face of Climatic Change: The End of the
Line in International Environmental Responsibility, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 107, 121–22
(2004); Susan Glazebrook, Human Rights and the Environment, 40 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON
L. REV. 293, 342 (2009).
135. See generally, e.g., Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice
Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169 (2008);
Jacqueline P. Hand, Global Climate Change: A Serious Threat to Native American Lands and
Culture, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,329 (2008); Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic
Climate Change Policy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,287 (2008); Robert R.M. Verchick, Adaptive
Justice, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER 881 (William H. Rodgers, Jr., Michael RobinsonDorn, Jennifer K. Barcelos & Anna T. Moritz eds., 2010). For a discussion of how some
prominent figures in the religious evangelical community have begun to portray climate change
as a human rights issue, see John Copeland Nagle, The Evangelical Debate over Climate Change,
5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 53 (2008).
136. See supra Part II.A.
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building construction, agricultural incentives, transportation
networks, threat disclosures, and other adaptive activities.
B. Procedural Overlay Implementation Mechanisms
The central point made in Part III is that the decisionmaking
challenges of climate change adaptation span across many fields of
law and will frequently address questions that no existing field of law
is capable of managing. It follows, therefore, that the procedural
approach used for climate adaptation law must operate at the same
level at which the emergent policy questions of vulnerability,
resilience, and equity operate. In terms of implementation, there is
any number of specific approaches that a field of climate change
adaptation could take to drape this procedural overlay on top of the
substantive fields of law tarred by climate change’s brush. We set out
a range of options below.
One could follow the strategy of the National Environmental
137
Policy Act (NEPA), which requires federal agencies to consider the
impacts of major federal actions that significantly affect the
environment. Similar to NEPA’s requirement of drafting an
environmental impact statement to inform the decisionmaking
process, agencies and decisionmakers would assess the cumulative
impacts of their adaptation actions and the implications for
138
vulnerability, resilience, and distributional equity. Unlike NEPA,
however, this process would go well beyond environmental impacts to
include significant social and economic aspects of adaptation
decisions. Operating at the state or federal level, the review
requirement could be triggered by a specific spending level for
projects or the significance of likely impacts. The agencies involved
would create a joint review with public notice and comment, ensuring
through that exercise alone that communication would occur among
the key parties operating in different substantive fields.
137. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006 & Supp. IV
2011).
138. For critiques of NEPA in the climate adaptation context, see, for example, Caleb W.
Christopher, Success by a Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact Assessment in
Addressing Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 549, 564 (2008) (proposing adaptive approaches
for NEPA in the climate change context); Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation Planning and Climate
Impact Assessments: Learning from NEPA’s Flaws, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,605, 10,607–13 (2009);
Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 1655, 1690 (2008); and Katherine M. Baldwin, Note, NEPA and CEQA: Effective Legal
Frameworks for Compelling Consideration of Adaptation to Climate Change, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
769, 789 (2009).
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NEPA is a reflexive statute, relying on information compiled at
139
the time of decisionmaking to improve decision outcomes. Agencies
complying with NEPA must consider the environmental impacts of a
140
range of alternatives. There is no requirement, however, to choose
the environmentally preferable option.
For an approach with teeth, one could borrow from the
141
comprehensive planning tradition of land use law to envision a state
law requiring cities to develop climate adaptation master plans
covering the breadth of adaptation policy. These plans would serve as
the reference point for requiring consistency with the plan’s goals and
details in decisions regarding land use, water management,
environmental protection, public health, and other policy agendas
directly connected to and affected by adaptation decisions. Similarly,
an independent state agency could oversee implementation of this
statute and provide both expertise and guidance to local
decisionmakers seeking to address the impacts of climate change.
Building on the plan-consistency model, federalism concerns
could be addressed by adding a layer of plan consistency above the
state-local level in the same manner as the Coastal Zone
142
Management Act (CZMA)
currently does for coastal-land
143
management. Under the CZMA, the federal government entices
the states to develop and enforce coastal-zone land use management
plans that meet federally defined goals not only with federal funding
144
support, but also with the agreement not to carry out, fund, or
145
finance federal actions that would conflict with the state plan.
Similarly, the federal government could both support state
development of adaptation plans according to federally defined
adaptation goals and agree to conform federal decisionmaking to
those state plans. This allows uniform overarching federal policy goals
to guide state planning, but at the same time responds to the need to

139. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
140. Agency Decisionmaking Procedures, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.1 (2012).
141. See generally CALLIES ET AL., supra note 115, at 458–71 (providing several examples of
local enforcement of land use law).
142. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1464 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
143. See JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 761–80 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the laws that impact beaches and
coastal lands).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a).
145. Id. § 1456(c).
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accommodate different conditions across states, which are likely to
146
vary widely under climate change.
147
Borrowing from the citizen-suit tradition of environmental law,
one could take a more decentralized approach. A statute could define
the three normative goals of adaptation policy and require agencies
engaging in adaptation investments to ensure that they plan for
adherence to those goals, with a private cause of action available to
the public as a mode of enforcement. Citizen-suit litigation is, for
example, the engine of enforcement for the Endangered Species Act’s
requirement that federal agencies assess the impacts of their actions
on protected species.
To be sure, there are obvious disadvantages to each of these
approaches. Environmental justice has been criticized as window
dressing, a politically correct gloss for environmental law and policy
148
decisions that pay little attention to distributional equity. NEPA has
been dismissed as a resource-intensive post hoc rationalization of
149
decisions that have already been made. And, equally, there are
150
rebuttals to these critiques. Our goal here is not to advocate for any
particular implementation model, but to show that there are
numerous implementation mechanisms tried and tested in analogous

146. See Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective
on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1176–91 (2010) (exploring federalism issues in
the context of climate adaptation).
147. See generally James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen
Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2003).
148. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILTY OFFICE, GAO-12-77, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: EPA NEEDS TO TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO HELP ENSURE EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION 22 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585654.pdf (arguing
that, despite years of efforts to implement an environmental justice plan within the agency, the
“EPA cannot assure itself, its stakeholders, and the public that it has established a framework to
effectively guide and assess its efforts to integrate environmental justice into the fabric of the
agency”).
149. The Council on Environmental Quality, for example, convened a NEPA Task Force to
hold hearings and review the statute’s operation. It reported that “[m]any respondents believe
that the general requirement to provide adequate analysis has been taken to an extreme, that
documents have become unconscionably time-consuming and costly to produce, and that the
resultant ‘analysis paralysis’ forestalls appropriate management of public lands and ultimately
leaves the public distrustful and disengaged.” CEQ TASK FORCE, REVIEW OF THE NEPA
PROCESS, at v (2002), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ntf/catreport.
150. See, e.g., Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Defending NEPA from Assault
(May 24, 2005), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/021003.asp (“For over 30
years, NEPA has provided an essential tool in helping federal managers do their jobs. When
done right, it promotes sound and accepted decisions.”).
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contexts that could provide frameworks for constructing a new field
of climate adaptation law and policy.
CONCLUSION
Most of the attention that legal scholars have given to climate
change adaptation has focused on how it will affect substantive fields
of law. There is an almost intuitive sense that because climate change
will wreak havoc, law and policy will necessarily transform across
numerous fields as well, even to the point of demanding an altogether
new field of law devoted directly to managing climate change
adaptation.
As we have shown through the Stationarity Assessment model,
however, the climate change-equals-legal-change premise is leading
down the wrong path. The intuition is on point—climate change
adaptation demands special attention in law and policy—but the
focus on substantive doctrine is off track. In short, it is not a new field
of substantive law that is needed—the Law of the Horse will work
fine at that level—but rather a new field of procedural law. And the
experience of environmental justice is particularly relevant here. Just
as environmental justice provides a distributional-equity prism to
assess the impacts of environmental law so, too, could a field of
climate change adaptation provide a powerful procedural framework
for assessing the legal and policy responses to climate change impacts.
Recall that environmental law largely supplanted nuisance law
primarily because nuisance doctrine was substantively inadequate to
manage modern pollution problems. By contrast, environmental
justice did not replace anything and is not a substantive body of law.
It emerged initially to fill a procedural gap in environmental law
decisionmaking—the need to ensure just distributional effects—and
later broadened its theory and practice as an overlay across many
fields.
Climate change adaptation may become yet another Law of the
Horse, and that might be appropriate. But this is not preordained.
Other fields of law will eventually have to adapt to climate change,
that much is clear. Whether the net result of independent evolution
sufficiently reduces vulnerability, increases resilience, and ensures
distributional equity, however, is far less clear.
The lawyers who gathered to justify and design environmental
law and environmental justice were not satisfied with how the Law of
the Horse looked to them. Could lawyers and policymakers similarly
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gather around a table tomorrow and ask, “What are we trying to do
with climate adaptation law and policy in the big picture? What
should the cumulative role of law and policy be in this emerging area?
How can we ensure law evolves in that direction?” Rather than
waiting to see how the Law of the Horse works out for climate change
adaptation, we argue that this is a discussion that can and should take
place now.

